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FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO ROMANIST
INFAMY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCEPTION OF IMPEACHMENT
MITCHELL FRANKLIN*

The Constitution stipulates that the President "shall be removed
1.from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."' It also provides
that: "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
2
Trial, Judgment and punishment, according to Law."
In an earlier paper 3 it was suggested that the above conception
of impeachment, which mentions not felonies, but "high crimes," reflected the influence of the French enlightenment on the 18th-century
Philadelphia constitutional convention, and hence the influence of
Roman law, with new or bourgeois qualities, on the text of the Constitution. Therefore, the American bourgeois conception of impeachment should not be understood as based on feudal English common
law. There is a confrontation in the Constitution between English
feudal common law and French bourgeois Romanist conceptions of
impeachment. It has been pointed out that John Taylor held that:
"Even in England [impeachment] ... is held in disrepute." 4 Bourgeoisfled and Romanized, impeachment in the United States is not the
same as "disreputed" English feudal impeachment.

I. INFAMY-IMPEACHMENT DETERMINED BY UNALIENATED PUBLIC OPINION

Because of the bourgeois Romanism of the enlightenment, the
American constitutional idea of impeachment reflects Roman law
* Professor emeritus,

State University of New York; professor emeritus, Tulane

University. A.B., Harvard University, 1922; J.D., 1925; S.J.D., 1928.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
3. Franklin, Romanist Infamy and the American Constitutional Conception of Impeachment, 23 BuFFALo L. Rav. 313 (1973).
4. Id. at 335 n.84.
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ideas relating to infamy-an institution not known in English common law. There were two important types of infamy, or loss of honor,
in Roman law. One was based on law (infamia juris); the other
was based on fact or act (infamia facti). The latter was justified by
what, after the French and American revolutions, would be called
public opinion. The protection and justification of public opinion
afforded by the first amendment creates a liaison with infamy based on
fact or act. Hamilton, in The FederalistNo. 65 stated that American
constitutional impeachment is political. This means-and he saysthat American impeachment is infamy-impeachment. The Constitution, therefore, consecrates Romanist infamy based on fact or act.
Hamilton wrote of "[t]he awful discretion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most
confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community."5
Impeachment means "a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors .. . of his country."6 Cesare Beccaria, the most
important theorist of the criminal law 9f the 18th-century enlightenment, said that "[i]nfamy is a mark of public disapprobation, that
deprives the criminal of the confidence of his country, and of that almost fraternal intimacy which society inspires. It can not be determined by law.' 7 Hence the Constitution separates infamy-impeachment, based on fact or act, from what may be called afflictive punishment. Only the latter must be punished "according to law."
It must be reiterated that the American constitutional texts relating to impeachment reflect the influence not of English law, but of
the French enlightenment, and hence the influence of Roman law
with new or bourgeois content. Plucknett wrote that "there can be
no doubt that, as far as the law of land is concerned, England became
the most thoroughly and consistently feudal of all the European
states."" Marx and Engels said: "(England and Naples, after the Norman conquest ... received the most perfect form of feudal organization) ."9 At the time of the American revolution, feudal England, both
in theory and practice, was undermined by bourgeois England, but, as
the law of England was and is uncodified, the legal superstructure
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 426 (Modern Library ed. 1937)
[hereinafter cited as FEDERALIST No. 65].
6. Id.
7. C. BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 54 (1963).

8. T.

PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw
THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 91 (1964).

9. K. MARX & F. ENGELS,

(A. Hamilton)

517 (5th ed. 1956).
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still seemed feudal. English common law as such is only secretly bourgeois; or putting the matter dialectically, feudal appearance seemed
to mask bourgeois reality. Jefferson wrote to Tyler:
I deride with you the ordinary doctrine, that we brought with us from
England the common law rights. This narrow notion was a favorite
in the first moment of rallying to our rights against Great Britain.
But it was that of men who felt their rights before they had thought
of their explanation. The truth is, that we brought with us the
rights of men, of expatriated men. 10
The American constitutional theory of bourgeoisfied Romanist
infamia facti as the basis for impeachment reflects Jefferson's activist
anti-feudal presentation. Indeed, Jefferson was hostile to Montesquieu, perceiving in this relatively early French theorist of the enlightenment a penchant toward feudalism. As Hamilton's theory of
infamy-impeachment represents an unacknowledged debt to Montesquieu's theory of impeachment as formulated within the latter's presentation of separation of powers, it is suggested that Jefferson would,
in part, have condemned Hamilton's discussion of infamy-impeachment in Federalist No. 65 because of the idea stated therein of the
role of the Senate in impeachment. "Where else than in the Senate
could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently
independent? What other body would be likely to feel confidence
enough in its own situation, to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced,
the necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the representatives of the people, his accusers?""' Hamilton here abstractly
restated Montesquieu's feudal, limited class-struggle theory of impeachment in which the latter said, as an aspect of his theory of separation of
powers, that "in order to preserve the dignity of the people and the
security of the subject, the legislative part which represents the people
must bring in its charge before the legislative part which represents
the nobility, who have neither the same interests nor the same passions."' 2
Hamilton's unhistoric conception of the role of the American
Senate, and Montesquieu's historic conception of the role of the
French nobility in impeachment, are both alienating or appropriating
10. 5 T.
3 NAT',
11.

JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 65
LAwY. GUILD Q. 27, 28 (1940).
FEDERALIST No. 65, at 425.

(1853); see Franklin, The Judiciary State II,

12. Franklin, supra note 3, at 321 n.31.
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conceptions. Thus, both Montesquieu and Hamilton would incur the
condemnation of Jefferson who, as has been indicated, wrote of the
revolutionary or self-motion of the Americans as that of "expatriated
men." In the impeachment theories of Hamilton and Montesquieu,
the American Senate or the French nobility are alienating or socially
appropriating forces, whereas to Jefferson, the goal of the American
revolution was to overcome or to appropriate an alienating or appropriating force, whether such is historic or unhistoric. Unalienated public opinion enjoys, in Jeffersonian thought, that role. Jeffersonian
ideology condemns the mediation of both historic and unhistoric structures or forms of appropriative alienation. The hegemony of public
opinion determines impeachment. In other words, the first amendment, understood as the activity of public opinion, determines impeachment. "[P]ublic esteem," says Holbach, "has more power over
men of elevated minds than the terrour of the laws."13
II.

INJURIES TO SOCIETY-HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS

Hamilton said that impeachments "are of a nature which may
with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself." 14 His political
conception of impeachment as "injuries" to the "society itself" is an
inclusive political conception-wider in scope than violation of positive
or formulated criminal law and also wider in scope than noncriminal
aggression against the text of the Constitution. It connotes injury to
what in the 18th century was called "civil society," that is, the infrastructural productive and class relations of men prior to and explaining ultimately the creation of the state as superstructure, for instance,
through social contract theory. Rawls has recently restated such theory,
but presents it as philosophic idealism, as appropriative alienation, as
external mediation and as mystification. He writes: "My aim is to
present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a
higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as
found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant."'15 Rawls abstracts or reduces
Hegel to a remote footnote,16 thus eliminating or distorting the role
13. 1 P.

14.

HOLBACH, THE SYSTEM OF NATURE

FEDERALIST No. 65, at 423.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11

15.
16. Id. at 521 n.3.

131 (1868).

(1971).
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of social contract in the dialectic of infrastructure/superstructure.17
Rawls abstractly continues:
[We are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of government. Rather,
the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure
of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the
principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their
own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. These principles
are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social
cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government
that can be established. This way of regarding the principles of
8
justice I shall call justice as fairness.
But after further discussion Rawls writes that "[t]he principles of
justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance."' 9 This, of course, would
not attribute hegemony to unalienated public opinion in determining
infamy-impeachment. The idea of the veil, mask, semblance, ambiguity,
etc. will appear again in this paper. Here it is sufficient to say that
Rawls justifies teleological secrecy as a Kantian unknowable-thing-in-

, 17. Id. Rawls here writes: "The notion of private society, or something like it,'is
found in many places. Well-known examples are in Plato, The Republic . . . and Hegel,
Philosophy of Right [Law] . . . under the heading of civil society. The natural habitat
of this notion is in economic theory (general equilibrium), and Hegel's discussion reflects
his reading of Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations."
In a letter, dated at Passy, March 14, 1785, Benjamin Franklin wrote Benjamin
Vaughan: "The English author is for hanging all thieves. The Frenchman is for proportioning punishments to offences . . . . [A]s the French writer says, Doit-on punir
un dilit contre la socijtj par un crime contre la nature? . . . . Superfluous property is
the creature of society. Simple and mild laws were sufficient to guard the property that
was merely necessary. The savage's bow, his hatchet, and his coat of skins, were sufficiently secured, without law, by the fear of personal resentment and retaliation. When
by virtue of the first laws, part of the society accumulated wealth and grew powerful,
they enacted others more severe, and would protect their property at the expense of
humanity. This was abusing their power, and commencing a tyranny. If a savage, before
he entered into society, had been told, 'Your neighbor by this means may become
owner of an hundred deer; but if your brother, or your son, or yourself, having no
deer of your own, and being hungry, should kill one, an infamous death must be the
consequence;' he would probably have preferred his liberty, and his common right of
killing any deer to all the advantages of society that might be proposed to him." 2
THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 479-80 (J. Sparks ed. 1840). In a footnote Sparks
translates "un dilit contre la societg" as "an offence against society" and "crime contre
la nature" as "crime against nature." Id. at 479. Franklin's letter first appeared
anonymously in a small volume published by Sir Samuel Romilly in 1786. Id. at 478.
The letter is published in Sparks' edition of Franklin under the title On the Criminal
Laws and the Practicesof Privateering.Id. at 478-86.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 12.
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itself, either as a veil for self-determined executive self-condonation of
infamia facti or as a mask for congressional grace or pardon for
infamia facti. Such subjectivism must be condemned.
Though Hamilton justifiies impeachment for "injuries" done to
the "society itself' and as such recognizes infamy-impeachment, the
Constitution also requires that impeachment be based on "high crimes
and misdemeanors." In The Federalist No. 65 Hamilton wrote of
infamy-impeachment, but never mentioned the phrase "high crimes."
This suggests that bourgeois infamy of "fact" for "high crimes" is
interchangeable with infamy of "fact" for "injuries" to the "society
itself."
The report by the Staff of the Impeachment Committee of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, sets forth the
background of the phrase, "high crimes and misdemeanors":
Briefly, and late in the Convention, the framers addressed the question how to describe the grounds for impeachment consistent with
its intended function. They did so only after the mode of the President's election was settled in a way that did not make him (in the
words of James Wilson) "the Minion of the Senate." The draft of
the Constitution then before the Convention provided for his removal upon impeachment and conviction for "treason or bribery."
George Mason objected that these grounds were too limited:
Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery only?
Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many
great and dangerous offences. Hastings is not -guilty of
Treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be
Treason as above defined-As bills of attainder which have
saved the British Constitution are forbidden, it is more
necessary to extend: the power of impeachments.
Mason then moved to add the word "maladministration" to the
other two grounds ....
When James Madison objected that "so vague a term wili be
equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate," Mason
withdrew "maladministration" and substituted "high crimes and
misdemeanors agst. the State," which 20
was adopted eight states
to three, apparently with no further debate.
In a vital footnote to this presentation, the following appears:
Mason's wording was unanimously changed later the same day from
20.

STAFF

OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY,

HousE CoM.

CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT,

(1974) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].

93d

ON

THE JUDICIARY,

Cong.,

2d Sess. 11-12

IMPEACHMENT"against the State" to "against the United States" in order to avoid
ambiguity. This phrase was later dropped in the first draft of the
Constitution prepared by the Committee on Style and Revision,
which was charged with arranging and improving the language
of the articles adopted by the Convention without altering its
21
substance.
This material, including the work of the Committee on Style and
Revision, 22 justifies Hamilton's recognition of infamy-impeachment,
including "factual" infamy, for "high crimes" or for "injuries done
immediately to the society itself," that is, to civil society, as aspects of
what later in this paper will be described as the concept of friend/foe.
To repeat, Hamilton in The Federalist No. 65 does not discuss
the bourgeois constitutional phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors"
and does discuss bourgeoisfied Romanist infamia facti. This connotes
that infamy of fact for "injuries" to the "society itself" and infamy of

fact for "high crimes" are interchangeable. The outcome of the Philadelphia convention, so far as this paper is concerned, shows the decline there of the feudal English bill of attainder and the rise of bourgeoisfied Romanist infamy, based on infamy of fact or act for "injuries" to the "society itself."
III.

INFAMIA FACTI AND HIGH CRIMES-Loss OF HONOR

Infamy of "fact" of "act" and the constitutional phrase "high
crimes" are not intended to have firm content or firm determination,
but they must relate to bourgeoisfied loss of honor or of civic honor,
including such in civil society. These ideas legitimate what Roscoe
Pound calls "standards" as distinguished from "rules" of law.2 8 Examples of "standards" are the ideas of "due care" and of "due process."
Such flexible legal formulations, lacking in detailed content, may be
called "Stoic" or "accordion-type" texts. The Constitution, especially
the Bill of Rights (the "second Constitution"), also determines the
content of the constitutional text through the structures or forms that
21. Id. at 12 n.48.
22. Of the five members of the Committee on Style and Revision, Hamilton, Madison and Morris were explicitly, or in effect, active adherents of infamy-impeachment, including infamia fecti. See generally Franklin, supra note 3 passim.
23. See R. POUND, OUTLINE OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 76-77 (5th ed.
1943) (bibliography).
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it creates. An example is the first amendment. The brevity of the
first and second Constitutions, due to the Romanist influence, anticipates the succinctness of the 18th century French civil code and of all
subsequent Romanist codification. As Hamilton conceives that
"high crimes" presuppose infamy of "fact," the flexibility of content
24
of infamia facti connotes the flexibility of content of "high crimes."
The flexible constitutional phrase relating to impeachment is
"high crimes," and not "felonies." It is not necessary to repeat the
criticism of "felonies" as a constitutional weapon which was made in
the Philadelphia convention. To this criticism it may be added that
"felony" had a feudal history and meaning and was not, even in masked
form, suited to a bourgeois conception of Romanist infamy, or loss of
honor, as the basis for presidential impeachment. The social forces
hostile to or suspicious of the existence of a presidency could not be
thus satisfied.2 5 Hence in situations other than impeachment the Constitution does accept "felony."
The relation between "felony" and feudal infamy or feudal loss
of honor was presented to Tocqueville after the French and American
revolutions.
The peculiar rule, which was called honour by our forefathers, is so
far from being an arbitrary law in my eyes, that I would readily
engage to ascribe its most incoherent and fantastical injunctions to
a small number of fixed and invariable wants inherent in feudal
society ....The state of society and the political institutions of the
middle ages were such, that the supreme power of the nation never
governed the community directly. That power did not exist in the
eyes of the people: every man looked up to a certain individual
whom he was bound to obey; by that intermediate personage he was
connected with all the others. Thus in feudal society the whole
system of the commonwealth rested upon the sentiment of fidelity
to the person of the lord: to destroy that sentiment was to open
the sluices of anarchy ....To remain faithful to the lord, to sacrifice oneself for him in his feudal undertakings whatever they might be
-such were the first injunctions of feudal honour ... . The treachery
of a vassal was branded with extraordinary severity by opinion, and a
particularly infaming name was created for the offence, which
was called felony [felonie] .... The rules of honour will therefore
24.
century,
cretion."
of "fact"
25.

It will be shown that Savigny, the great feudal German Romanist of the 19th
was hostile to infamy of "fact" because it permitted "free" or "sound" "disHowever, the American Constitution permits such "discretion" through infamy
or the constitutional phrase "high crimes."
Franklin, supra note 3, at 328-29.
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always be less numerous among a people not divided into castes
than among any other .... Thus the laws of honour will be less
peculiar and less multifarious among a democratic people than in
an aristocracy .... Among a democratic nation, like the Americans;
in which ranks are identified, and the whole of society forms one
single mass .. .it is impossible ever to agree beforehand on what
shall or shall not 'be allowed by the laws of honour .... Consequently, the dictates of honour will be there less imperious and less
stringent; for honour acts solely for the public eye-differing in this
respect from mere
virtue, which lives upon itself contented with its
26
own approval.
In writing that honor "acts solely for the public eye," Tocqueville
parallels Hegel's fundamental conception of recognitive being-the
heart of the theory of infamy-impeachment. But Hegel also said: "[I]nasmuch, then, as honour is not only a semblance in me myself, but
must exist also in the mind and recognition of another which again on
its part makes a claim to a similar honorable recognition, honour is
the extreme embodiment of vulnerability."27 This may be veered into
what may be called the bourgeois meaning of infamy indicated by the
Constitution. The first, or Philadelphia Constitution, through infamyimpeachment or infamy as loss of bourgeois honor, justifies the vulnerability of the bourgeois honor of the executive. This concept is
strengthened by the second Constitution, for the first amendment consecrates the Public Opinion State. On the other hand, the second
Constitution shields American public opinion from "Vulnerability"
through the fifth amendment, which condemns mass infamy (for instance, racism by the President), by requiring grand jury indictment
and petit jury conviction for a formulated, infaming crime. 28
Hegel also shows that Montesquieu's and, of course, Tocqueville's
discussion of honor masks historical struggle over property and thus
class or factional rivalry. Hegel wrote that
the fact that Montesquieu discerns "honour" as the principle of
monarchy at once makes it clear that by "monarchy" he understands,
not the patriarchal or any ancient type... but only feudal monarchy,
the type in which the relationships ecognized in its constitutional law
are crystalized into the rights of private property and the privileges
26. 2 A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AmERICA 248-49, 354-56 (1877)
lation slightly altered by this author for sake of exactness).
27. 2 G. HEGEL, TuE PHILOSOPH1Y OF FINE ART 335 (1920).
28. Franklin, supra note 3, at 337.

(trans-
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....[I]t is not duty but only honour
of individuals and Corporations
29
which holds the state together.

When Tocqueville's feudal particularism, that overlooks mass
infamy and the struggle between the "noble" and "base" or mass con0
sciousness, already discussed elsewhere through Beccaria and Hegel,3
is developed by negation into the flexible American constitutional
conception of "factual" infamy-impeachment, the bourgeois significance of Hamilton's "bridling"3 1 thought that infamy-impeachment
concerns "injuries" done historically by the President to the "society
itself," including civil society which exists prior to the state itself, appears with all its brilliance. The relation between a flexible, historic
conception of "factual" infamy-impeachment and "high crimes" stands
out when it is perceived that American bourgeois, Romanist infamyimpeachment concerns infrastructural civil society.
It is essential to recognize that the content of "factual" bourgeois, American infamy-impeachment and of "high crimes" or loss of
bourgeois honor is flexible, or, to be more exact, determined historically
by unalienated public opinion. Max Scheler, the phenomenological
existentialist, would hold to the contrary. "The fact that one does or
does not possess honor does not depend originally on the judgment

carried by the ambient world-but it exists as such, independently of
this ambient world ....." 82 Scheler thus only recognizes the "essence"

of honor or infamy apart from social history. Since infamy is historical
infamy, however, it was a mistake for Agnew to quote Calhoun, who
said infamy, if true "ought to degrade me... and consign my name to
perpetual infamy."3 3 Because infamy is historical, it may not be permanent. The social nothingness of the infamed may be veered by honor29. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT [LAw] 178 (1942).
30. Franklin, supra note 3, at 331. "According to Confucius, the fate of man is
ordained by 'Heaven'; all men are unalterably either 'noble' or 'base'. The younger must
humbly submit to their seniors, subordinates to their superiors." M. ROSENTHAL & P.
YuDiN, A DICTIONARY O PHILOSOPHY 91 (1967).
31. Franklin, supranote 3, at 323.
32. M. ScHELER, LE FORMALISHE EN PTHIQUE ET L'PTHI2UE MATERIALE DES
VALEURS
565-66 (1955). Present-day German science of criminal law discusses
opposition between "subjective" and "external" honor. H. WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE
STRAFRECHT 276 (9th ed. 1965).
33. Franklin, supra note 3, at 332. It is suggested that Calhoun's knowledge of
Romanist infamy came through Thomas Cooper, whose Institutes of Justinian appeared
in 1812, supplementing the civilian activity of Edward Livingston in Louisiana during
the same period. Livingston wrote of Spanish infamy. Id. at 316 n.13.
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able act or fact from social nothingness to social being. 34 In The
FederalistNo. 43, Madison wrote "of an unhappy species of population bounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular
government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character." 5
Max Scheler, not a jurist, was apparently unaware of Romanist
infamy. Savigny, the most important Romanist of the 19th century,
and the head of the feudal counter revolutionary German historical
school of law, contrary to Hamilton and contrary to the American
Constitution, condemns Roman infamia facti as arbitrary. In 1840 he
wrote:
Beside this juridically determined infamy, there are many cases
in which the customary-moral judgment of right minded and rational
men either because of individual acts, or because of entire life-style,
suffices to give judgment decisively against honor, as if the conditions
of infamy really existed. The innovations ground upon this the
classification into infamia juris and infamia facti. In fact only for the
first is the name of infamy made use of juridically, and the mentioned
artificial expressions therefore are not merely corrupt because they
do not conform to the sources, but because they easily seduce to
wrong process, for infamia facti seeks fresh determined conditions and
effects which nevertheless can be valid only for true infamy
(infamia juris). All effects, which one has sought to attribute
infamia facti, resolve themselves into fully free discretion Ureyen Ermessen], at one time of the highest power and its authorities (at the
post of officials), at another time also by the judge (for instance,
in the credibility of witnesses) ....
[I]n that way every mediating
concept of infamia facti however appears not only as dispensable,
but also as perplexing and misleading to error. The total lack of
equality of so called infamia facti and true infamy is exhibited in that
it lacks all secure earmarks: partly because the usually grounded
opinion comes forth in different shadings, without firm boundaries;
partly public opinion is often wrong in that it permits determination
through prejudice instead of customary-moral grounds, or through
groundlessly acceptable fact.36
Savigny's criticism justifies the attack on political infamia facti
imposed for decades by congressional committee and by executive
34. The real crime at Attica was the official belief that convicted or infamed
prisoners through resistance to prison oppression could not regain their fame.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 285 (Modem Library ed. 1937) (J. Madison).
36. 2 F. SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES REUTIGEN RmSIScOEN RECHTS 187 (1840); ef.
16 D. DIDEROT, OEUVRES COMPL TES DE DIDEROT 138 (1821) (ignominie).
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activity in violation of the fifth amendment.37 But he ignored constitutional infamia facti directed against the oppressive President. What
Hamilton regarded as vital in The FederalistNo. 65 is flexible infamia
facti or infamy-impeachment of the President for "injuries" to the
"society itself." The feudal theorist, Savigny, flourishing during the
period of Metternich and European counter revolution, would not
accept this. Writing of English criminal law seven centuries ago, Bracton, who has been prominent in the discussion of impeachment,
quoted Digest 3.2.22 saying " 'It is not the beating that imposes the
stigma of infamy, but the reason for which it merited imposition.'" 8
This relates Bracton to Hamilton's position that infamy-impeachment,
including infamia facti, connotes "injuries" to the "society itself" (including civil society), or "high crimes."
Although Savigny, as quoted, appears hostile to infamia facti he
must be taken to admit that American constitutional infamy-impeachment is Stoic or flexible, determined by public opinion, and, as
Hamilton said, may be directed against "injuries" done to the "society itself." It must be repeated that Savigny, as leader of the distinguished German historical school of law, plays a counter revolutionary role, confronting the French revolution both in practice and
in ideology. Although infamy was the weapon of the feudal noble consciousness against the base and oppressed, Savigny resented the veering
of infamy against the noble consciousness. This appears more clearly
in Savigny's discussion of capitis deminutio and of civil death in the
French law as a weapon against the ancient regime.
A. Crime and Delict
The consecration in the American Constitution of infamy-impeachment, as justified by unalienated public opinion, indicates, as
noted above, that infamy-impeachment, including infamia facti, explains, embraces and signifies the constitutional requirement that the
President be guilty of "high crimes and misdemeanors." That the language of the Constitution embodies Romanist ideas of the French
37. Franklin, supra note 3, at 337.
38. 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 290 n.98b (1968).
It is unfortunate that Thorne, the translator of Bracton, has, at least here, translated
"causa" as "the reason." Romanist causa should be taken to connote social justification
or social presupposition.
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enlightenment also bears repetition. In the history of Roman law, the
word "crimes" need not necessarily connote criminal law,3 9 but
is also a synonym for delict, or what in Anglo-American common
law, means "tort." The Romanist constitutional text (article two, secdon four), relating to "high crimes" relates to "factual" Romanist infamy-impeachment which is not necessarily responsibility to the positive
criminal law. Hence, article one, section three of the Constitution provides (with appropriate emphasis indicated by this writer) that: "Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor,
trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted
shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law." Article one, section three,
and article two, section four, are thus consistent because "crimes" in
article two, section four, connote the Romanist sense of "crimes,"
which, as has been said, may mean infamy for delict (or even quasidelict) in the sense of responsibility which may exist, but which may
owe nothing to positive criminal law and which may mean infamyimpeachment as justified by unalienated public opinion for wrongs
to offences4" against, or "injuries" to the "society itself."
Hamilton made very clear the consistency of the relationship between article one, section three, and article two, section four, in The
FederalistNo. 65. He wrote of "[t]he awful discretion which a court of
impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy
the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the
community." 41 In the following sentences Hamilton added that impeachment means "a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors . . . of his country." 4 This is a reference to the
"high crimes" or infamy responsibility created in article two, section
four. Hamilton then asks: "Would it be proper that the persons who
had disposed of his fame, and his valuable rights as a citizen, in one
trial, should, in another trial, for the same offence, be also the disposers
39. Without reference to Roman law this matter is excellently discussed in
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of his life and his fortune?" 43 This is a reference to article one, section
three, of the Constitution which imposes responsibility to the positive
criminal law.
As has been said in Roman law, the word "crimes" may connote
responsibility which is not a violation of positive criminal law. Likewise, positive criminal law may be described as "delictal," or as "tort"
in the sense of Anglo-American common law. Reference has already
been made to the influence of Beccaria within the United States during
the late 18th century as the great theorist of the enlightenment concerning criminal law. The title of his work on criminal law is usually
translated into English as "On Crimes and Punishments." The title of
the Italian text, however, is "Dei delitti e delle pene." 4 Laplaza's
Spanish translation is entitled "De los delitos y de las penas." 4 Morellet's influential French translation of 1765 is entitled "Trait6 des
d6lits et des peines." 4 6 J.-A.-S. Collin de Plancy's French edition of
Beccaria, dated 1823, is entitled "Des ddlits et des peines" with "various
notes and commentaries" of "Franklin" and others-"Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, Roederer, Brissot de Warville, Morellet, B6renger,
Rizzi, Servan ......

47

Another late edition of 1797 by Roederer, based

on Morellet's "Trait6 des delits et des peines par Beccaria" has material by "J~r6mie Bentham." 48 Indeed, all thirty-six texts relating
to Beccaria listed by Laplaza (the list is incomplete) employs the appropriate word for "delict" in the Italian, French and Spanish languages. Laplaza mentions that Morellet's French translation of 1765
or 1766 was reprinted at least six times in 1766, possibly in Lausanne,
Philadelphia, Bern, and Amsterdam." Laplaza mentions a Spanish
translation of Beccaria, "Disertacion sobre los delitos y las penas," as
having been printed by "Robert Wright" in Philadelphia in 1823.50
The Romanist reciprocity or indifference in delict/crime and
crime/delict is discussed by Buckland and McNair, and supported by
Lawson, the editor of their second and revised edition. They wrote:
[In principle an action in tort is an action for compensation ....
43. Id.
44. C. BECCARiA,

45.
46.
47.
48.

DE
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Id. at 171.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
49. Id. at 529.
50. Id. at 536-37. See also id. at 161.
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For the Roman action on delict we must reverse these propositions.
Delict is imbued with the idea of vengeance and the action is primarily
not for damages, but for a penalty . . . . [T]he primary aim is not
compensation .... The distinction is fundamental. It allies the law
of delict with that of crime rather than with that of other civil obligation, so much so that Mommsen in his Strafrecht, somewhat to the
confusion of his readers, hardly distinguishes between delict and
crime except in matters of procedure. And while delictum and maleficium are the appropriate names for a delict and crimen is used
mainly in connextion with crime, the distinction is not maintained
dearly in Justinian's books and not entirely in the surviving classical
texts. A similar blurring of the line between tort and crime, a line
which can easily enough be drawn for practical purposes, but is very
hard to fix scientifically, is found in our law. The old appeals of
felony straddled across the line, and the writ of trespass, which perhaps arose out of them about the middle of the thirteenth century,
for many centuries more showed some signs of a criminal ancestry
by often including the words "vi et armis . . . et contra pacem
nostram." . . . But although the criminal association of our early

conception of tort or torts has left its mark, we seem to have had
less difficulty than the Romans in differentiating between the two
conceptions. The Roman law of delict has far more affinity to the criminal law than to the law of tort; the penalty is indeed paid to the
injured party, not to the State, but still it is a penalty and not
51
damages.
In his masterwork, Buckland stated his thought more succinctly,
writing in a footnote:
For G[aius] delictum or maleficium is a civil delict. The word crimen
is appropriate to public wrongs ....But the usage is not so constant
as to require, as he claims, expulsion of any text conflicting, e.g. G.
1.128, 2.181 where it seems to mean misdeed of any kind, 3.197,
208 where crimen must refer to furtum as a civil wrong, P.5.26.2
where delictum is a crime; still less, pompus enactments of the late
classical age ....52

The presentation of Schulz, as it touches the relationship of Roman law and Roman equity, is too complicated to be discussed here,

save in certain of its aspects. He wrote that:
In the legal language of the dominant classical lawyers delictum
51. W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAm, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAw 344-45 (2d
ed. F. Lawson 1965). The presentation would have been slightly stronger if the word
"reparation" instead of "compensation" would have been used.
52. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BooK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AuGuSTUS TO JUSTINrAN
576 n.7 (2d ed. 1932) (citations omitted).
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meant an offence from which resulted iure civili a penal obligation
(obligatio ex delicta) and a penal action (civilis actio poenalis).
Instead of delictum the lawyers sometimes used the term maleficium
.... Grimen was used by the classical lawyers to designate an offence
which was punishable by public criminal law .

. ..

This was the

terminology of the leading classical lawyers and perhaps also of the
imperial chancery. Gaius, however, who was not one of the dominant
lawyers, went his own way ....

Apparently he did not find followers

during the classical period, but the post-classical lawyers caught up
his idea and developed it further . . .. Crimen was now also used
to designate offences from which resulted penal actions ....

In this

'book we will ignore the classical terminology and adopt the postclassical usage .

. .

. For that reason we define delict as follows:

Delictum was an offence from which resulted a penal obligation
and a penal action, either iure civili or iure honorario0I
Schulz, aware of the dialectic of law, discussed Roman social history which resulted in a tendency toward the indifference of delict
and criminal law. He wrote:
The classical penal actions afforded a powerful protection for material
and immaterial interests . . . nevertheless, the wide scope of these

actions comes as a surprise to us. Within the civilization, and particularly legal civilization, of the classical period they seem to us very
primitive and old-fashioned, for we hold today that it is on principle
the duty of the State to punish its subjects and that private law
should be confined to actions for damages; a private penal action
seems justified only for the protection of immaterial interests (actio
iniuriarum). However, Roman public criminal law at the end of the
Republic was 'still far below the standard of civil law; two centuries
of revolution and war had paralyzed the administrative activity and
had prevented the development of criminal law ....

Thus the penal

actions served as a supplement to the unsatisfactory criminal law. "
Schultz then made a comparative reference through Pollock and
Maitland to the history of English feudal law:
Under Edward I a favorite device of our legislators is that of giving
double or treble damages to "the party grieved." They have little
faith in "communal accusation" or in any procedure that expects
either royal officials or people in general to be active in bringing
malefactors to justice. More was to be hoped from the man who
had suffered. He would move if they made it worth his while. And
so in a characteristically English fashion punishment was to be in53. F. SCHULZ,
54. Id. at 573.
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flicted in the course of civil actions: it took the form of manyfold
reparation.i 5
Schulz added: "This is also a good description of the legal situation
in Rome at the end of the Republic." 56 Schulz continued:
Under the Principate, criminal justice was administered more
promptly, but the private penal actions remained unaltered ....
Most probably the competing criminal procedure in which the judge
was also entitled to award damages to the offended came in practice
to supersede gradually the private penal actions, particularly in the
provinces; but the classical lawyers in Rome as usual took no notice
of this development and continued to discuss eagerly the .law of penal
actions as if it were still living law. The post-classical history of the
penal actions is still obscure; not even Justinian's law has been fully
analyzed. But this much is clear: the penal actions were not abolished
by Justinian . .

.

. In modem Roman law the penal actions grad-

ually developed into mere actions for compensation; in England
57
they served as a model to the legislators under Edward 1.
Pound, the only American Romanist of the 20th century possessing
international stature, may be here mentioned.
In Roman law there was a contractual theory of delicts. A wrong
gave rise to a claim on the part of the person injured to a penalty recoverable from the wrongdoer by the legal proceeding appropriate to
collection of a debt. When the penalty came to be thought of as a
penalty of reparation, the debt analogy had fixed the conception of
an obligation ex delicto ....

In the common law, on the other hand, for historical reasons,
there is a tort theory of contracts. One sues for damages for nonperformance of a promise instead of to exact performance. 5s
Pound here indicates that, in Roman law, penalty, which is criminal, is
also regarded as "obligation," obligatio ex delicto, which is not criminal. Probably the indifference of criminal law/delict possible in Roman legal history, so that "delict" may be either civil or criminal, is
due not only to the social history mentioned by Schulz, Buckland,
McNair, Lawson, but also to the role of litis contestatio in Roman law.
Roman law process virtually begins with litis contestatio or the proce55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 573-74. Here again "reparation" should have been employed instead of
"compensation."
58. R. POUND, supra note 23, at 186.
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dural contract by which the parties to the litigation contractually submit to the competence of the adjudicating force. This resulted in what
here may be called a novation in which the wrong is replaced by contract. Of importance is that the constitutional American public law
phrase "high crimes" not only avoids "felony," but develops the Romanist idea that "delict" may be a "crime." The "delict," wrong, or
"high crime" justifying impeachment is the infamia facti discussed by
Hamilton in The FederalistNo. 65. Infamy, including infamia facti,
as Beccaria said, "cannot be determined by law," 9 but is political
condemnation for a wrong, an offence, a maleficium, a "delict," a
"high crime."
Strachan-Davidson wrote of the process of indifference in Roman
delict/crime through the focus of Mommsen's scholarly contribution on
Roman criminal law. 60 Strachan-Davidson points out that Mommsen
accomplishes two tasks which become important in the American constitutional conception of impeachment. In the first place, Mommsen
justifies the process of the indifference historically. Strachan-Davidson
wrote:
The extent to which the primitive self-help is to be reckoned a
source of Roman criminal law may be roughly gauged by ascertaining what offences were at any historical time dealt with, as delicta
under the forms of civil action ....Theft in all its forms, including
fraud, embezzlement, and breach of trust, all personal outrages,
assaults, woundings and insults (injuria), all trespass on the rights of
property, all libel, all slander, and false witness, all invasion of the
chastity of members of the family (stuprum), are dealt with, in whole
or in part, as private wrongs ....
Mommsen rightly refuses to allow the differences of procedure
to obscure the essential fact that such trials are really part of the
criminal law. "The fundamental characteristic," he says, "of a moral
law broken, and a reparation prescribed therefore by the State, unites
the two spheres in an essential identity, and the difference, whether
the reparation is realized is a suit at public or at private law, appears
in comparison superficial and accidental." . . . In these suits under
the forms of private law, the penalty inflicted . . . may be hardly
less severe than that which the State dispenses in its "public" justice. 0'
In the second place, Strachan-Davidson relates the indifference
of delict/crime to Mommsen's discussion of the self-determined or self59. Franklin, supra note 3, at 318.
60. T. MOMmsEN, R&iscHrs STRAFRECHT (1899).
61. 1 J. STRAcHAN-DAvIDSON, PROBLEMS OF THE ROMAN

(1912) (repl. 1969).
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help role of the Roman tribunate in confronting Roman patrician
power through intercessioor of veto. Strachan-Davidson quoting Mommsen: "The 'sacrosanctapotestas' of the tribune is originally an euphemism for revolutionary self-help;" and again, "[i]n place of the death
penalty prescribed by law for the violation of the magistrate, we find
the political self-help, confirmed by oath, which intervenes whenever
the law is exhausted, especially in the case of the ban laid on the
kingship or any equivalent power." 62 With regard to American constitutional impeachment, this indicates that the Congress, justified
by unalienated public opinion, is sacrosanct in regard to its power of
impeachment. It makes its own tribunitial determination of what are
"high crimes" and may understand "high crimes" as meaning "high
delicts" in the sense stated by Hamilton, who justified infamy-impeachment for "injuries" to the "society itself." The Congress, justified by such public opinion, may not, in its impeachment determinations, be subject either to the President or the Judiciary. The sacrosanct position of the impeaching Congress is threatened by the opinion
of Chief Justice Burger in United States v. Nixon. 63 This maintains
62. Id. at 13. "Because of this principle of self-determined concurrence, founded
on the veto or negative power (intercessio) of the plebeian tribunes, it may be said that
social power during this period was based on the concurrence of two great social classes.
Mommsen calls this a period of 'class struggle.'" Franklin, Concerning the Mission and
Contemporary Force of Romanist Intercessio, in 2 STUD IN HONORE DI VINCENZO
ARANGIo-Ruiz 269, 270 (1952).
63. 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference to a privilege
of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge
of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based.
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly
has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon
every defendant in a criminal trial the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him?'....
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of
confidentiality of presidential communications in performance of his responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of
criminal justice. The interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and
entitled to great respect. However we cannot conclude that advisers will be
moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of
disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for
in the context of a criminal prosecution.
. . . Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally
frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications
will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
... The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Id. at 3109-10 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote the Court added:
We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's generalized
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the Kantian method of choice of placement/displacement, determined
by what Hegel called the external or holy moral legislator, which is
a method of appropriative alienation among Kantian antinomies.04
There appears to be a struggle, inherent in the mechanistic
structure of separation of powers, between Burger and Hamilton as
to what power ultimately will enjoy or seize the alienating hegemony
of external mediation, of the holy moral legislator, of the unhistoric
prince of the enlightenment. Although Hamilton, as has been shown,
justifies infamy-impeachment, he, in The Federalist No. 65, seizes,
appropriates, occupies, alienates such power of infamy-impeachment,
including infamia facti, by attributing to the Senate a role outside
history. "What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough
in its own situation," Hamilton wrote, "to preserve unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an individual accused,
and the representatives of the people, his accusers?" °5 Thus, unlike
Mommsen, but resembling Burger, Hamilton pretends that there is
a power, situated outside history, which mediates among other powers
of state. To Hamilton, the Senate, in infamy-impeachment, thus enjoys the role of the unhistoric mediator or unhistoric prince of the
enlightenment; to Burger, the Supreme Court enjoys the power of the
interest in confidentiality and the need for revelant evidence in civil litigation,
nor with that between the confidentiality interest and congressional demands
for information, nor with the President's interest in preserving state secrcts.
We address only the conflict between the President's assertion of a generalized
privilege of confidentiality against the constitutional need for relevant evidence
in criminal trials.
Id. at 3109, n.19. See also note 130, infra.
64.
The moral attitude is, therefore, in fact nothing else than the developed
expression of this fundamental contradiction in its various aspects. It isto use a Kantian phrase which is here most appropriate-a 'perfect nest'
of thoughtless contradictions. Consciousness, in developing this situation,
proceeds by fixing definitely one moment, passing thence immediately over
to another and doing away with the first. But, as soon as it has now set up
this second moment, it also "shifts" (verstellt) this again, and really makes the
opposite the essential element. At the same time, it is conscious of its contradiction and of its shuffling, for it passes from one moment, immediately in its
relation to this very moment, right over to the opposite. Because a moment
has for it no reality at all, it affirms that very moment as real: or, what comes
to the same thing, in order to assert one moment as per se existent, it asserts
the opposite as the per se existent. It thereby confesses that, as a matter of fact,
it is in earnest about neither of them. The various moments of this vertiginous
fraudulent process we must look at more closely.
G. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 629-30 (2d ed. 1931).
65. FEDERALIST No. 65, at 425.
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magistrature, justified by idealistic natural law ideas of the legal
theory of the 18th century French physiocrats and received within
the United States by Chief Justice Marshall. Gerry, in his attack on
the constitutional projet of Philadelphia said he wanted a text with
a "more mediating shape.' 66 Hamilton, Marshall, and Burger are
each concerned with the mediating power-their quarrel is a quarrel
as to its placement.
There is certainly a conflict between Mommsen and Hamilton in
that the latter justified senatorial unhistoric mediation in the process
of impeachment. The position of Hamilton (and perhaps Gerry)
derives from the thought of Montesquieu, who in impeachment activity justified the appropriating or mediating role of the nobility,
which had neither the same interests nor the same passions as the
impeaching accusers and the impeachable accused. Hamilton differs
from Montesquieu in that the former masks the interests and passions
66. Franklin, supra note 3, at 326. In the United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090
(1974), Chief Justice Burger said:
In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the
Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation
of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others. . . . Many
decisions of this Court . . . have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." Id. at 177 ....
Our system of Government "requires that federal courts on occasion
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given
the document by another branch." . . . And in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211,
82 S. Ct. at 706, the Court stated: "[D]eciding whether a matter has in any
measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government,
or whether authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution." Notwithstanding the deference each branch
must accord the others, the "judicial power of the United States" vested in

the federal courts by Article III, § 1 of the Constitution can no more be
shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can
share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a presidential veto. Any other conclusion would
be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and
balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. The Federalist,
No. 47, p. 313 (C. F. Mittel ed. 1938). We therefore reaffirm that it is
"emphatically the province and the duty" [of] this Court "to say what the law
is" with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. Marbury v.
Madison, supra, 1 Cranch. at 177, 2 L.Ed. at 60.
Id. at 3105-06. See also note 130 infra.
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of the Senate by removing the Senate from history whereas the latter
refrains from such veiling of the appropriation or alienation. 7
Perhaps the discussion, indicating the identity in Roman law of
delict/crime, and justifying infamia facti, may be concluded and extended by referring to the succinct formulations of Adolf Berger in
his Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law. In his essay on "Crimen"
Berger wrote that the antonym is "delictum... in classical terminology
... applied to private offences to be punished by the aggrieved person
himself and punished by a penalty to be paid to the latter. In postclassical language the two terms are used interchangeably since public
prosecution absorbed the wrong-doings previously classified as delicta."'6 s In his essay on "Delictum," Berger stated that it is "[a] wrongdoing prosecuted through a private action of the injured individual
and punishment by a pecuniary penalty paid to the plaintiff ....
The actions by which the injured person sued for a penalty were
ACTIONES POENALES, and the procedure was that of a civil action
....

The distinction delicta privata-publicawhich corresponds to the

classical distinction of delicta and crimina, is of post-classical origin." 0
Of "Crimina publica" Berger wrote: "Crimes against the public and
social order which were defined by special statutes (leges iudiciorum
publicorum) .... New kinds of crimes, unknown in the past, were...
submitted to criminal prosecution, and some wrongs previously defined
as private offences (as some kinds of theft...) were treated as public
70
crimes and prosecuted through public accusation."
It is now possible to examine the Romanist word "crime" as it was
used during the 18th century and hence by the French enlightenment.
As such it gave meaning to the American constitutional text stipulating impeachment for "high crimes and misdemeanors." It already
has been shown at some length that Beccaria used the word "delict,"
not in a private law sense of "tort," but in a criminal law sense.
Beccaria thus continued the Romanist indifference of crime/delict.
Of course the American Constitution could not translate "delict" as
"tort," in part because Samuel Johnson's dictionary of the 18th century
67. Philosophically the methodology of mediation or appropriation of antinomles,
here discussed, has its origin even before Kant, who, as has been shown, was condemned for such by Hegel, in that it appears as early as Descartes, the founder of
modern philosophy.
68.
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69. Id. at 430.
70.

Id. at 418.

(1953).

IMPEACHMENT

said that the word "tort" was obsolete (though it was used in France).
However, even if the word "tort" had been in use, it lacked public
or constitutional law value, and thus had to be translated as "crimes".
Book III, title IV of the Romanist bilingual Louisiana civil code
or digest of 180871 shows the interchangeability of French "delict" and
"crime." The English text reads: "Of Engagements Formed Without
Agreements, or of Quasi Contracts and Quasi Offences." 72 The French
text reads "Des Engagemens qui se forment sans convention, ou des
Quasi-Contrats et Quasi-D6lits." 73 Section II of the same title is translated "Of Quasi Crimes or Offences," 74 but the French title of the
same section is "Des Quasi-D6lits." 75
Book III, title IV, article 4 reads in English: "Quasi offences are
a man's acts on his part faulty, not liable indeed to be punished, by
the simple correctional or criminal police, but obliging him to make
some reparation of the damage resulting from them."76 In French this
reads: "Les quasi d~lits, sont les faits de l'homme qui contiennent, de
sa part, une faute non susceptible d'6tre punie par la police simple,
correctionnelle ou criminelle, et qui 'obligent
quelque r~paration
77
r~sulte."
est
en
qui
du dommage
Book III, title IV, Section II, article 16 reads: "Every act whatever
of man, that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it
happened, to repair it, even though the fault be not of the nature of
those which expose to the penalties of simple or correctional police."78
The French text says: "Tout fait quelconque, qui cause autrui un
dommage, oblige celui, par la faute duquel il est arrive, h le rdparer,
encore que la faute ne soit point de la nature de celles qui exposent
Ades peines de police simple ou correctionelle." 79
71. These Louisiana references may be found in THE DE LA VERONE VOLUbME, published in 1968, which is a reprint of MOREAU-LISLET'S CoPY OF A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL
LAW Now IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS (1808) [hereinafter cited as THE
DE LA VERGNE VOLUIME].

72. Id. at 318.
73. Id. at 319.
74. Id. at 320.
75. Id. at 321.
76. Id. at 318.
77. Id. at 319.
78. Id. at 320.
79. Id. at 321. The de la Vergne Volume notes the Roman, French, and
feudal Spanish commentaries and texts which relate to the above materials from the
Louisiana civil code of 1808. Other parts of the bilingual Louisiana civil code of 1808
indicate the indifference of crime/delict and ensuing problems. Book III, title II,
chapter VI, section IV, article 130, stipulates, in English, that: "The just causes for
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Jean Domat (1625-1696) and Robert Joseph Pothier (1699-1772)
are the great French jurists who most influenced the legal history
which culminated in the bourgeois French civil code of 1804. Domat
seems most worthy of discussion relative to the words "crime" and
"dMlit" in connection with the American constitutional phrase "high
crimes." 80 Like Beccaria in the 18th century, Domat seems to have
been a Jansenist, and was, indeed, close to Pascal. 8' Domat wrote of
"crimes et ddlits" in book III and book III, title 1 of Le droit public,
suite des lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel.82 The discussion of delict
which parents may disinherit their children are twelve in number, to wit . . . 2dly.
If the child has been guilty towards a parent of cruelty, a crime or grievous injury."
Id. at 230. The French text uses, in the appropriate place, "dilits ou injures graves."
The same article continues: "4thly. If the child has accused a parent of any capital
crime, except however that of high treason." Id. at 237. The French text employs the
words "quelque crime capital." Article 132 also employs the phrase "capital crime" or
"crime capital" in a related problem.
Book I, title VII, chapter V, section I, article 57, says in English that: "Fathers
and mothers are answerable for the offences, or quasi offences, committed by their
children in the cases prescribed under the title of the quasi contracts and quasi crimes
or offences." Id. at 54. The French text uses in appropriate places the words "delits et
quasi delits." Id. at 55.
Book III, title II, chapter V, section III, article 67, provides in English that revocation of donation inter vivos "on account of ingratitude by the donee to the donor
can take place . . . 2d. If he has been guilty towards him of cruel treatments, crimes
or grievous injuries." Id. at 222. The appropriate French text says "ddlits ou injures
graves." Id. at 223.
Book III, title II, chapter VI, section VII, article 198, translates the French word
"fault" (faute) as "offence." Id. at 252. In Book III, title IV, section II, articles 20, 21,
the word "ddlit" is six times translated as "delinquency." In a seventh instance "ddlit"
is translated as "trespass." Id. at 320-21
80. The only important interest shown in Domat within the English-speaking
world, despite his importance in French legal history, is the recent pamphlet of R.
Batiza, Domat, Pothier and the Code Napolion (1973). This is a meticulous study or
concordance of the relation between particular texts of Pothier and Domat and particular
formulations or articles of the French projet of the Year VIII (1800) and the French
civil code of 1804. It supplements Moreau-Lislet's materials in The de la Vergne Volume,
(see note 71 supra), and is an excellent work. "A knowledge of the Civil Law, sufficient for the purposes of an American Lawyer, north of New Orleans, may be obtained
from Domat and Wood [and others named]; but neither Domat nor Wood, are superseded by any or all the rest." T. COOPER, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN vi (3d ed.
1852).
81. The edition of Domat used in writing this paper (from the Faculty of Law
and Jurisprudence of the State University of New York at Buffalo) has a book-plate
which reads: "Charles F. Claiborne, attorney-at-law, 13 Carondelet St., New Orleans."
Presumably this owner was related to the first American governor of Louisiana, who
was close to Jefferson and Madison. The name "Rawle" also appears in pencil in the
various volumes. This may refer to William Rawle, who, in 1825, wrote of the importance of the constitutional guarantee of the republican form of government.
82. The text of Domat here used is part of a four-volume printing. J. DoMA%,
OEUVRES COMPLETES DR. J. DOMAT (Nouvelle ed. . . . augmentle de l'indication des
articles de nos codes qui se rapprochent aux diffirentes questions traitges par cet auteur
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and crime consists of twenty-nine pages. Domat's presentation, which
should be translated and published in full, can only be cursorily
considered here. It will show the uncertainties and complexities, which
explain the constitutional phrase "high crimes" as meaning "crime"
in the sense of delict and not in the sense of modem criminal law.
Domat's presentation confronts the indifference of delict/crime in the
history of Romanist law. Because of that indifference, delict may
connote Hamilton's "injuries" to the "society itself" or infamia facti
as based on "injury," "crime," "delict," maleficium, wrong, offence,

"guilt" as used by Hegel in the sense that only a stone is innocent.

In Book III, Domat wrote:
We do not have in our language a common word which comprehends in general and precisely the two words, crimes and delicts; for
the word misdeed [mifaits], which could signify both is no longer in
use; but not only do we not have the appropriate word the significance of which comprehends both crimes and delicts, we do not even
have rule or usage which distinguishes precisely the sense of the word
delict and that of crime ....

And although one commonly under-

stands by the word crime a theft, a murder, a homicide, a falsification
and other evil actions, which merit the punishment of death, the
galleys, banishment and other high [grandes] punishment; and as the
simple word delict is ordinarily understood to extend to actions less
evil and less punishable, but which can deserve some punishment,
such as some insult; some wound in a quarrel; one does not leave
off from making use of the word delict in order to express the
highest crimes [les plus grandes crimes] ....
[B]ut one never gives
the name crime to insults, nor to wounds in a quarrel; and these
are called simple delicts. Thus the word delict sometimes means
crimes, but the word crime is never spoken of a slight delict [un
leger dilit].
It is out of this consideration of a lack of our language of a common term which suits all crimes and all delicts that this book has been
entitled: crimes and delicts; and as these two words have different
significations, but which are not sufficiently distinguished; in order
to give a just and precise idea, it has been necessary, before speaking
of crimes and delicts, to make this principal reflection on the usage of
these two words; and it is necesary moreover to add thereto that
in the Roman law, from which these words have been taken, they
also have no signification appropriate to each one, and do not accord
with the other, but often there are confounded; there is also no just
and appropriate word in the Roman law which signifies exactly and
...par J. Remy 1835) [hereinafter cited as DOMiAT]. The materials on public law of
interest here are in volume three, also published in 1835.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
precisely all that the two words, crimes and delicts, respecting which
it would be useless to enlarge here; but it is necesary to remark here
a difference which is made in the Roman law between the two sorts
of crimes or of delicts which contain them all, and divide them into
two species, which it is necessary to understand because of the relation they have to our usage.
The first of these two species of crimes and delicts were those
which were called public, and the second of themr were called
private. Public crimes were those of which some law permits every
sort of person to form the accusation in justice, even one who has no
interest therein; and private delicts were those the prosecution of
which was only permitted to interested persons . . . . It will be seen
in the following what there is in this distinction between public and
private delicts which is related to our usage; but it is necessary early
to remark that though in the Roman law one might use commonly
the words delicts for private delicts, and the word crime for public
crimes, one gave the name of crimes to private delicts and the name
of delicts to every sort of crime without distinction.. ..83
After some discussion, too long to be considered here, Domat
added: "[I]t suffices to know that by our usage one considers as crimes
and public crimes all crimes and all delicts the punishment of which
it is important to the public not to remain unpunished .... ,4
In 1755 Samuel Johnson published his great English dictionary.
However, this cannot be unqualifiedly accepted in so far as he purports
to define or to state thought relating to the French and American
enlightenment. For instance, it is a mistake to determine the meaning
of article four, section four of the Constitution relating to the guarantee of republican form of government, from Johnson's dictionary,
and, in regard to the problems of American constitutional infamyimpeachment, the same reservations must be stated. What Johnson
shows is a lack of firmness in his presentations relevant to this essay.
Johnson did not include delict in his text and stated that the word
"tort" was obsolete. Domat used this word freely, though not in an
Anglo-American common law sense. Some discussion by Johnson
follows, 5 with commentary by this author.
83. 3 DOmAT 535.
84. Id. at 538. Domat also wrote of honor and of infamy in connection with
delicts and crimes. Id. at 553. It is not necessary, however, to restate his thought here.
85.
At the time the Constitution was adopted, "crime" and "punishment for
crime" were terms used far more broadly than today. The seventh edition of
Samuel Johnson's dictionary, published in 1785, defines "crime" as "an act
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"Grime . . . [a]n act contrary to right; an offence; a great fault;
an act of wickedness." The Louisiana civil code of 1808, which is
Romanist, in Book III, title IV, Section II, translates "Quasi-Ddlits"
as "Quasi Crimes or Offences." 16 Schulz wrote that "instead of delictum the lawyers used sometimes the term maleficium."8 Buckland
88
in part wrote that for Gaius "delictum or maleficium is a civil delict."
In the 13th century, Bracton wrote of actions that of those ex maleficio,
some are criminal, others civil. Of the criminal, some are major,
others minor, and others of the heaviest kind, according to the
magnitude of the crimes committed. There are the major crimes,
called capital because they involve the supreme penalty or the
loss of members or exile, perpetual or temporary. The minor
which entail flogging, or the pillory or ducking-stool or imprisonment, sometimes with, sometimes without infamy, depending on
what the reason is. "It is not the beating that imposes the stigma
of infamy, but the reason for which it merited imposition." And
so of those that are in personam and arise ex delicto or quasi, as
the actio iniuriarum, which is sued civilly, for an iniuria may be
grievous or slight and accordingly a heavier or lighter punishment will follow, according to the verse, "I will show you what
the punishment is when the wrong is admitted."8 9
Elsewhere Bracton wrote: "Of personal actions arising ex maleficio
or quasi some are criminal, others civil. Of the criminal, some are
major, others minor; of the civil the same is true." 90 Adolf Berger
spoke of "Maleficium. A crime, wrongdoing. It is not a technical
juristic term and is used as syn. with both crimen and delictum." 91
This is the matter that plagued Domat. Berger continued: "At times
it is syn. with magia; see Maleficus." 9 2 The latter, Berger wrote, "Corncontrary to right, an offense; a great fault; an act of wickedness." To the
extent that the debates on the Constitution and its ratification refer to impeachment as a form of "punishment" it is punishment in the sense that
today would be thought a non-criminal sanction, such as removal of a corporate officer for misconduct breaching his duties to the corporation.
STAFF REPORT 20 n.15. The references to Johnson's dictionary lacks pagination.
86. THE DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 71, at 320, 321.
87. F. SCHULZ, supra note 53, at 572.
88. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 52, at 576 n.7.
89. 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 38, at 290, Folio 10lb.
90. Id. at 291, Folio 102.
91. A. BERGER, supranote 68, at 573.
92. Id.
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monly denotes a sorcerer ....In similar connection maleficus (adj.) is
93
syn. with magicus."
To continue with Samuel Johnson's formulations:
To infame . . . to defame; to censure publickly; to make infamous; to brand. [Johnson's confusion of infamy and defamation
is a serious mistake and appears repeatedly in contemporary usage.]
Infamous. Publickly branded with guilt; openly censured; of
bad report.
Infamousness . . .Infamy .... Publick reproach; notoriety of
bad character.
Criminal . . . Wicked; criminal, faulty to a high degree; contrary to duty; contrary to virtue. [Johnson here quotes Hamlet]:
So crimeful and so capital in nature.
Misdemeanor ...offence; ill behavior; something less than an
atrocious crime.
4
Offence... 1. crime, act of wickednessY
IV.

UNALIENATED

PUBLIC OPINION:

THE MEDIATING POWER

In accordance with Hamilton's thesis that infamy-impeachment
or loss of honor is to be determined by "injuries" to the "society
itself" it must be repeated that, after the consecration of the first
amendment of the second Constitution (the Bill of Rights), the determination of infamy must be responsive to public opinion. To this
two important ideas should be added.
1. If necessary, the "veiling" of reality, behind which impeachable infamia facti lurks, must be lifted. In modern Roman law this
masking is called "simulation." Diderot, speaking of the enlightenment, condemned "veiling" 5 and, indeed, the idea of the enlightenment is enlightenment. The problem of impeachable "veiling" by
George III was discussed by Kant in 1798:
Another, although easily penetrated, but still nevertheless regular
93. Id. Although the American newspapers have thrown up a wall against a
Romanist and enlightenment conception of infamy-impeachment, the irrational, magical
sense of maleficium has been welcomed. Thus, Russell Baker wrote: "'What worries you,
Mr. Lincoln?' I asked. 'That sinister force that General Haig said erased the famous
tape,' he said, 'Nobody took it seriously, but there is a sinister force, and it is at large
right here in the White House.'" N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1974, at 33, col. 6. On
"malefice", see 17 D. DmERoT, OEUVaES COMPLiTES DE DIDEROT 516-21 (1821).
94. S. JOHNSON, DICTIONARY (Ist ed. 1755). On "capital" reference may be
made to the discussion of capitis deminutio in the first article on infamy-impeachment.
Franklin, supra note 3, at 338. See also H. BRACTON, supra note 38, at 290, Folio 101b.
95. See "voiler" in 20 D. DIDEROT, OEUVRES COMPLiTES DE DIDEROT 353 (1821).

IMPEACHMENT

concealment directed against a people, is that of the true nature of
its constitution. It would be the violation of the majesty of the
people of Great Britain to say to it that it may be an unlimited
monarchy; but it is maintained that the will of the monarch is
constitutionally limited through the two houses of parliament, and
yet everyone knows very well that the influence of the same on these
representatives is so great and unfailing that nothing different is
determined by the aforesaid houses from what he desired and through
his minister proposes; he then indeed all at once proposes decisions,
with which he knows and also effects it that opposition to it will grow
(for instance, regarding the trade in Negroes) in order to give a
semblance of evidence of the freedom of parliament. This presentation of the nature of the matter has in it the illusion that the constitution truly conforming to law becomes looked for no more; because
one considers to have found it in an already available instance, and a
mendacious publicity deceives the people with illusion of a monarchy
limited through law proceeding from it, in which its deputies, won
through corruption, subject it secretly to an absolute monarchy. 96
In a footnote to the above, Kant says of the limited monarchy of
George III:
A cause, the nature of which one does not discern directly, is
revealed through the operations on which its lack of openness
depends.--What is an absolute monarch? It is he who on whose
command if he says: there ought to be war, there forthwith is war.What is a limited monarch? He, who must ask the people in advance,
whether there should be war or not, and if the people say that there
ought not to be war, thus there is no war.-For war is a situation, in
which the sovereignty of all state force must stand in command.
Now the monarch of Great Britain truly conducts much war, without
seeking any consent thereto. Thus, this king is an absolute monarch,
which he indeed should not be under the constitution; this he however continually can overcome; precisely because through each state
force, namely, as he has in his power to bestow all offices and
honors, he can keep securely to himself the agreement of the representatives of the people. To be sure, this covering-up system must
however have no publicity in order97to succeed. It remains therefore
under the transparent veil of secrecy.

2. It has been shown that Scheler regarded honor as a thing-initself which owed nothing to its ambience, that is, to property or the
infrastructure of society. It has also been shown that Tocqueville's
96. I.

KANT,

Der Streit der Fakultaten, in 6

97. Id. at 363-64.

WERKE

361, 363 (1964).
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idea, of honor was superstructural feudal. The position of Domat,
because of his relation to Pascal, is interesting. As God, he says,
"judges the heart,"9 18 there may be a secular law of crimes and delicts.
God has absconded or hidden. With regard to civil death, Domat
wrote: "One calls civil death the status of those condemned to death,
or to other punishments which carry confiscation of goods. This is
done as this state is compared to natural death, because it suppresses
from society and from life those who sink there, and renders them
as slaves of the punishment which is imposed on them." 9 Savigny criticizes Domat for writing that civil death makes the condemned "a
slave of the punishment."100 But as Domat related such enslavement
to "confiscation of goods," he, in effect, made it possible to say that
civil death and, of course, infamy get their meaning of non-being or
nothingness from the property and class relations of the social infrastructure. Hegel related the law of honor not to the ideology of the
feudal superstructure, but to feudal property relations. Despite the
validity of certain details of Savigny's comments on Domat, the latter
has implicitly contributed much to a constitutional and legal theory
of civil death and of infamy, in that, although the now civilly dead
and the infamous are such because of appropriative alienation,
the victims of such appropriation, through their struggle to
negate the appropriation, had alienated such alienation. This influences Hegel's conception of the dialectic of oppressor/oppressed, and
so far as infamy-impeachment is concerned, the latter is the alienation
of the appropriative alienation for which Kant condemned George
III. Bracton appears to have anticipated Domat's thinking. In his discussion of patrimony or property and outlawry, Bracton contended
that the meaning of outlawry is the social nothingness or non-being
of the outlaw because of his loss of social relations: "When one
has thus been outlawed, properly and according to the law of the
land, we must see what he forfeits by the outlawry .... It is clear that
he first forfeits the country and the realm and is made an exile, such
as the English call an 'outlaw;' in ancient times he used to be called
by another name, that is, 'friendless man,' from which it is apparent
that he forfeits his friends."' 0 1 This "friendless man" may be an
98.
99.
100.
101.

3 DOMAT 558.
1 DOmAT 106.
2 F. SAVIGNY, supra note 36, at 151-52.
2 H. BRACTON, supra note 38, at 361, Folio 128b.
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ancestor of Heidegger's 20th century "homeless" humanity.10 2 Bracton
added: "Hence if anyone wittingly feeds him after his outlawry and
expulsion, or harbours him or communicates with him in some way
or hides or keeps him, he ought to receive the same punishment as
the outlaw . . . ... 103 Thus, Bracton's outlaw is similar to Domat's
"slave of the punishment," though Bracton's "outlaw" and Heidegger's
"homeless" humanity are perhaps described differently from Domat's
"slave" and from Fichte's "animal," mentioned in the first essay on
infamy-impeachment, and from Madison's and LaBruy~re's self-manumitting or self-emancipating animal that walks upright, mentioned
earlier in this essay. Bracton is closer to Domat when he describes the
property consequences of "inlawry." ".A man lawfully and properly
outlawed is restored to nothing but the peace so that he may come
and go and have peace; he cannot be restored to his actions nor to
other things because he is as it were a child newly born and a man
newly created. [sic] nor restore him to his previous actions and obligations."'01° This is related to the questionable theory of Calhoun
0 that infamy is permanent or perand Agnew0 05 and possibly Cooper"'
petual. After the above discussion, Shakespeare is not only refreshing,
but also presents problems which Hegel later considered. Shakespeare
contributed much to the discussion of the relation of property to honor
and to the loss of honor in the struggle to determine infamy-impeachment. Falstaff, speaking to Pistol in Act II, scene II of The Merry
Wives of Windsor, says: "[Y]ou stand upon your honourl Why, thou
unconfinable baseness, it is as much as I can do to keep the terms of
mine honour precise. I, I, I, myself sometimes, leaving the fear of God
on the left hand and hiding my honour in my necessity, am fain to
shuffle, to hedge and to lurch." Shakespeare has shown here that crisis
of property is reflected in crisis of honor. As has been said, Hegel, in
his criticism of Kant indicated that Kant, himself, like George III,
was guilty of masked placement and displacement, of irony, of Verstellung, of shifting, of equivocation, of shuffling. Shakespeare put
this as "to shuffle, to hedge and to lurch."
102. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in THE EXISTENTIALIST TRADITION 225
(1971).
103. 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 38, at 361, Folio 128b.
104. Id. at 373, Folio 132b.
105. Franklin, supra note 3, at 332.
106. T. COOPER, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (1812>. This work was used by my
predecessor in teaching Roman law at the University of Tulane. My teaching began in
1930.
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To Shakespeare, "baseness" or infamy is individual; to Hegel it
is social and is an aspect of his discussion of the social struggle between the feudal "base" consciousness and the "noble" consciousness.
The "noble" struggles to appropriate or to alienate the "base," and the
"base," through its discovery of its self-consciousness by its work for
the "noble," seeks to alienate the alienation, to debase the noble consciousness, and ennobling the "base." This, then, is the meaning of
the struggle in infamy-impeachment of the debased Congress, moved
by appropriative alienating presidential "injuries" to the "society
itself," as Hamilton put it. Phrased somewhat more precisely, the debasement or infaming of the American mass by the American President, which may be negated by infamy-impeachment of the President,
is thus an aspect of social struggle inspired by appropriative alienation,
or by "injuries" to the "society itself."
A. Theory of Friend/Foe-Presidential
Hegemony
The American presidential theory of appropriative alienation is
inspired largely by the existential theory of friend/foe propounded
by the Nazi "crown jurist" and existentialist, Carl Schmitt, 10 7 who
said in 1932: "The specific political discrimination of which political
affairs and motives permit themselves to be reduced, is the discrimination between friend and foe." This writer has stated that Schmitt's
discrimination between friend and foe "understood as a conception of
geopolitical distance, was also a conception of anthropological 'distance.' "108 Such "distance," when "unveiled," is a theory of appropriative alienation. "The conceptions of friend and foe," Schmitt wrote in
Der Begriff des Politischen, published in 1932, "are received in their
concrete, existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols, nor mixed or
107. What this writer says of Schmitt owes something to a paper on Schmitt
prepared several years ago by Peter R. Engelhardt, Esq., a member of the New York
Bar, for my course in philosophy of law. The literature on Schmitt is vast. See, e.g.,

A.

HERNANDEZ-GIL,

METODOLOGIA DEL DERECHO

314 (1945)

LUK. CS, DIE ZERST6RUNG DER VERNUNFT DER WEG
SCHELLING ZU HITLER 516-24 (1955)
(for philosophical

DES

(for legal theory); G.
IRRATIONALISMUS

VON

ideology). Marcuse describes
Schmitt as "the one serious political theorist of National Socialism." H. MARCUSE,
REASON AND REVOLUTION 419 (1941).
108. Franklin, The Mandarinism of Phenomenological Philosophy of Law, in 2
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

562 (1973).
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weakened through economic, moral and other presentations."' 109 Restated as an American presidential idea of friend/foe, Schmitt's conception particularizes or specifies the "injuries" to the "society itself"
which Hamilton presented as the justification for infamy-impeachment for presidential constitutionally condemned "high crimes."
B. ConstitutionalSeparation of Powers
Because of historical conditions now obtaining within the United
States, including the infrastructure, American thinking which justifies the domination or "distancing" by the presidential power exploits
the ambiguity of the first Constitution in that the President largely
reflects Carl Schmitt's ideology of friend/foe. The first (or ironic)
Constitution consecrated Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers,
and did so ambiguously," 0 so that harmony or unification of the three
state powers required either an absurd, philosophically idealistic
"moral" harmonizing force or justified struggle among the three
powers for mediating hegemony. That struggle would take the form
of the already mentioned Kantian placement and displacement of
such powers in order to achieve a unifying hegemony or mediation
among them. In part, this explains the mission of the hegemony of
the "distancing" presidential ideology of friend/foe, which Carl
Schmitt inspires. In the earlier article on infamy-impeachment, this
author directed attention to the consideration of Althusser and Eisenmann"' relative to the weakness and role of Montesquieuan constitutional ideology in French legal history. This weakness has been exploited in the United States by the concept of the struggle for hegemony among the powers as friend/foe. American Montesquieuism is
perhaps more vulnerable than Freich to the ideology of the struggle
of friend/foe. The conception of separation of powers, which in France
109. C. ScHrsTT, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN 15 (1932). Schmitt's existential conception of friend and foe justifies not only Nazi agression, but also that aggression within Germany itself. After the Second World War, Schmitt stated his thought
as a theory of international law in Der Nomos der Erde, published in 1950.
110. At the conclusion of the constitutional convention at Philadelphia in 1787
Madison wrote Jefferson in Paris regarding "the impossibility of dividing powers of
legislation in such a manner, as to be free from different constructions by different
interests, or even from ambiguity in the judgment of the impartial." Letter from James

Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, in 5
26 (1904).
111.

Franklin, supra note 3, at 321.

WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON

17,
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had a certain historical bias or penchant toward the mediating role
of the nobility in impeachment, has been understood in the United
States either feudally or abstractly and formalistically, save through
the possibility of actualizing sacrosanct congressional power of infamyimpeachment, as strengthened by the public opinion state created by
the first amendment of the second Constitution. Contemporary American presidential ideology of friend/foe, however, is directed against
such congressional hegemony and against its power of infamy-impeachment.
Engels said of Montesquieu and Rousseau ideologically that "the
constitutional Montesquieu is indirectly 'overcome' by Rousseau
with his 'Social Contract' . . . ." "1 The problem of the Rousseauan
struggle for the state, especially when infamy-impeachment is forgotten, is the legacy of the ironic, unstable first or Philadelphia Constitution. Infamy-impeachment, sacrosanct and justified by the first
Constitution itself and by the public opinion state, consecrated in
the first amendment as a text of the second Constitution, is a constitutional weapon within the texts of the two Constitutions mentioned.
This is possible only if public opinion is not appropriated or alienated
public opinion. But what has been said of struggle for hegemony must
be understood, not merely superstructurally, but infrastructurally. It
is the infrastructure, the "otherness" of the superstructure, which gives
social meaning to ideology including the ideology of separation of
powers and the struggle for hegemony to mediate among them. In
a famous letter to Mehring, written in London on 14 July 1893,
Engels said:
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives
impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be
an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent
motives .... The ideologist who deals with history (history is here
meant to comprise all the spheres-political, juridical, philosophical,
theological-belonging to society and not only to nature) .. .possesses
in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone
through an independent series of developments in the brains of
these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to its
own or other spheres may have exercised a co-determining influence
112. Letter from Friedrich Engels to Franz Mehring, July 14, 1893, in KARL
1846-1895, at 511 (1935).
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on this development, but the tacit pre-supposition is that these

facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought."'
The jurist will be alert to Engels' use not only of the words "false
consciousness," but also "tacit pre-supposition."'' 4 Herein, "tacit presupposition" connotes that the struggle for hegemony or to mediate
among the separated powers indicates that the meaning of such
struggle is infrastructural, but seems to be ideological in a pejorative
sense, that is, exclusively superstructural. What Althusser says of the
infrastructural basis of the role of feudal honor may be restated as
the infrastructural or phenomenological impure intention of bourgeois honor. "Honour is thus the passion of a social class." ' 5 This
matter has already been discussed in connection with the theory of the
relation between honor and property. It is the mission of infamyimpeachment (impeachment for loss of bourgeois honor, that is, for
"injuries" to "society itself") to struggle against bourgeois passion,
to struggle against the aim of Schmitt's ideology of friend/foe, as
received in the United States. That ideology only serves to actualize
undemocratic hegemony by eliminating the force of the infrastructure
of society from the struggle to achieve the hegemony of this or that
power. It exploits the original ambiguity, irony, equivocation which is
the truth of the separation of powers structurally established by the
first Constitution. It is today the mission of sacrosanct infamy-impeachment, as determined by the first amendment, to justify struggle to
prevent or to negate an undemocratic presidential hegemony based
on the ideology of friend/foe.
It must be emphasized, however, that Montesquieu candidly, and
Hamilton in veiled form, justify separation of powers as weapons of
appropriative alienation, although at the same time Hamilton brilliantly presented the theory and role of impeachment for infamia
113. Id.; see N. Thevenin, Ideologie juridique et ideologie bourgeois, 173 LA
71 (1974).
114. The latter, for instance, explains Cardozo's "presupposition imminent" and
similar thought in some recent history of American law. Franklin, A Pricis of the American Law of Contract for Foreign Civilians, 39 TUL, L. REv. 635, 681-86 (1965). However, the really great idealist theorist of "presupposition" is Windscheid, the 19thcentury German Romanist scholar. The opposition thereto is represented in the idealist
phenomenology of Husserl, which, vulgarized, becomes part of the history of the revival of idealist natural law in this century.
115. L. ALTHUssER, PoLITICs AND HISTORY 72 (1972). Of the extensive scholarship relating to Althusser, among the most important is D'Amico, The Contours and
Coupures of Structural Theory, TELOs, Fall, 1973, at 84-89.
PENSgE
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facti. As indicated, Montesquieu justifies impeachment through the
mediation of the nobility because the nobility "have neither the same
interests nor the same passions" 116 as the impeaching and impeachable
social force. This appears in the midst of Montesquieu's discussion
of separation of powers, and is an aspect of Montesquieu's fear of the
requirement of self-mediated unanimity of social classes, as true social
classes, contained in the early Roman tribunitial or intercessio principle, which controlled the relations of Roman plebeians and Roman
patricians. But Hamilton veils or dissimulates the infrastructural force
by an alienating methodology which is external to history and abstract
compared to Montesquieu's historical, alienating, mediating methodology, justifying the impeaching hegemony of the nobility. Hamilton
reserves the appropriating hegemony or the power of alienation or
role of "distancing" to the Senate as the latter was intended to be in
the 18th century. "What other body would be likely to feel confidence
enough in its own situation to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the
necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the representatives of the people, his accusers [in infamy-impeachment process]?" 1" 7 (Hamilton did not always have this confidence in the "distancing" of the Senate.) 118
Hegel has at least two important discussions of separation of
powers and of its role in the French revolution. In The Phenomenology of Mind he shows that the superstructural legal outcome of
the class character of the French revolution took the form of consecrating separation of powers on the basis of bourgeois social relations.
He -wrote:
The accomplished result at which this freedom

. . .

might manage

116. 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 159, cited in Franklin,
supra note 3, at 321 n.31.
117. FEDERALIST No. 65, at 425.
118. He stated, at the Philadelphia convention on September 8, the day on which
the constitutional determination relating to impeachment was virtually settled, that:
"He was seriously of opinion that the House of Representatives was on so narrow a
scale as to be really dangerous, and to warrant a jealousy in the people for their liberties. He remarked that the connection between the President and Senate would tend
to perpetuate him, by corrupt influence. It was the more necessary on this account
that a numerous representation in the other branch of the Legislature should be established." J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at
608 (1966). At this moment, then, Hamilton's thought relating to the Senate as unhistoric or external mediator in impeachment is not that stated by him in The Federalist No. 65. Rather, it is closer to that of Kant in the latter's considerations relating to George III and to the "veiling" or dissimulation of power by a monarch-president
over parliament.
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to arrive, would consist in the fact that such freedom qua universal
substance made itself into an object and an abiding existence. This
objective otherness would there be the differentiation which enabled
it to divide itself into stable spiritual spheres and into the members of
distinct powers. These spheres would partly be the thought-constituted
factors of a power that is differentiated into legislative, judicial and
executive... and, since the content of universal action would be more
closely taken note of, they would be the particular spheres of labour,
which are further distinguished as more specific "estates" or social
ranks. Universal freedom, which would have differentiated itself in
this manner into its various parts, and by the very fact of doing so
would have made itself an existing substance, would thereby be free
from particular individualities, and could apportion the plurality of
individuals to its several organic parts." 9

C. Infamy-Impeachment-Negation of PresidentialHegemony
Because regimes based on separation of powers are masked or
veiled class regimes, so that "universal freedom is therefore death,''12
Hegel continued:
The government is itself nothing but the self-established focus, the
individual embodiment of the universal will. Government, a power to
will and perform proceeding from a single focus, wills and performs
at the same time a determinate order and action. In doing so it, on
the one hand, excludes other individuals from a share in its deed,
and, on the other, thereby constitutes itself a form of government
which is a specifically determinate will and eo ipso opposed to the
universal will. By no manner of means, therefore, can it exhibit itself
as anything but a faction. The victorious faction only is called the
government; and just in that it is a faction lies the direct necessity of
its overthrow; and its being government makes it conversely, into a
faction and hence guilty.l2e
Herein is the germ of the structural weakness of separation of powers
and of the instrument of Schmitt's idea of friend/foe for exploiting
such weakness; therein exists also the necessity for infamy-impeachment to negate faction-government grounded in the ideology of friend/
foe with its quest for the amity or friendship line, as Schmitt called
it, where the foe confronted establishes the reality of its own strength
and is recognized or acknowledged thereby as friend.
119. G.

HEGEL, supra note 64, at 603.
120. Id. at 605.
121. Id. at 605-06. See G. HEGEL, THE

PHI.OSO Hy OF HiSTORY

452 (1956).
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In his Philosophy of Law Hegel unwillingly develops his thought
to present the dialectic implicit in the ironic doctrine of separation
of powers, which precipitates fluctuating struggle among the powers
or factions for hegemony among them, or, to be more precise, precipitates fluctuating struggle among them to become the mediating power
among them. The struggle is a fluctuating struggle because the bourgeois infrastructure is unstable and necessitates bourgeois factionalism.
The dominant or mediating power is potentially dominant because
each of the powers is internally the same as the other in that each
power essentially possesses the moment of judgment. The sixth and
seventh amendments deal only with judicial judgment. The state
powers, each capable of judgment, constitute, dialectically, a unity-ofopposites. As each power is a judgment-power, it is essentially the same
as the others, and may engage in struggle with the others to become
the mediating power, as factionalism necessitates because of the instability of the infrastructure. In paragraph 272 of his Philosophy of
Law, Hegel wrote that
the principle of the division of powers contains the essential
moment of difference, of rationality realized. But when the abstract
Understanding handles it, it reads into it the false doctrine of the
absolute self-subsistence of each of the powers against the others ....
This view implies that the attitude adopted by each power to the
others is hostile and apprehensive, as if the others were evils ....
If the powers (e.g. what are called the "Executive" and the
'Legislature") become self-subsistent ... the destruction of the state
is forthwith a fait accompli. Alternatively, if the state is maintained
in essentials, it is strife which through the subjection by one power of
the others, produces unity at least, however defective, and so secures
the bare essential, the maintenance of the state. 122
It is hardly necessary to belabor the role today of American presidential theory of friend/foe in thus seeking presidential hegemony. The
mission of infamy-impeachment is to negate such hegemony. Hegel
probably would not understand this. He wrote that: "To take the
merely negative as the starting-point and to exalt to the first place
the volition of evil and mistrust of this volition, and then on the basis
of this presupposition slyly to construct dikes whose efficiency simply
necessitates corresponding dikes over against them, is characteristic
in thought of the negative Understanding and in sentiment the out122. G.

HEGEL,

supra note 29, at 175.
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look of the rabble." 123 However, in the addition to Paragraph 272,
Hegel says:
The truth is that the powers are to be distinguished only as moments
of the concept. If instead they subsist independently in abstraction
from one another, then it is as clear as day that two independent
units cannot constitute a unity but must of course give rise t6 strife,
whereby either the whole is destroyed or else unity is restored by
force. Thus, in the French Revolution, the legislative power sometimes engulfed the so-called "executive," the executive sometimes
engulfed the legislative, and in such a case it must be stupid to
formulate e.g. the moral demand for harmony ....The vital point...
is that since the fixed characters of the powers are implicitly the
whole, so also all the powers as existents constitute the concept as a
24
whole.1
Because they are bourgeois or feudal-bourgeois theonsts, there is

an aspect of the ideology of separation of powers, which is more or less
vulnerable to Schmitt's presidential friend/foe, whether the theorist is
Montesquieu, Hamilton or Hegel. Earlier in this essay it was said in
passing that Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers was directed
against the early Romanist legal idea of intercessio or the tribunitial
power, according to which state determinations required the unanimity of the two acknowledged social classes, the plebeians and the
patricians (slavery was ignored). The ideology of separation of powers
is an ideology in which bourgeois (or feudal) factions struggle for
the alienating or mediating power in the state, but from which the
masses are excluded or in which the masses are subordinated. This is
the force of Hamilton's "distancing" of the Senate in the process of
infamy-impeachment, even though he gives the masses the impeaching
or accusing role in infamy-impeachment. Although he does not mention Romanist intercessio (which, as has been said, was understood
by Montesquieu) and though he is, in general, undialectical in his
thought, Althusser has much of importance to say relative to the
privileged and exclusionary position of the bourgeois factions which
struggle among themselves for the mediating power (to recall Gerry's
demand, in the Philadelphia convention for "a more mediating
123. Id.

124. Id. at 286.
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shape"'' 2 5 or structure of the first Constitution).
istically in truth writes:

(Althusser mechan-

We can illuminate the meaning of this division and its ulterior motives, given of course that Montesquieu is concerned with the combination of puissances and not with the separation of powers, by
examining all the possible encroachments of one power on another and
the possible combinations of one power with another,in order to find
which encroachments and combinations are absolutely excluded. I

have found two, which are of prime importance.
The first excluded combination is for the legislature to usurp the

powers of the executive: which would immediately consummate the
collapse of monarchy into popular despotism. But the inverse is not
the case. Montesquieu accepts that monarchy may survive and even
retain its moderation, if the king controls not only the executive, but
also the legislative power. But let the people become the prince and
all will be lost.
The second excluded combination is more famous, but to my
mind it has been treated as too obvious and for that reason not fully
examined. It concerns the investment of the judiciary in the executive, the king. Montesquieu is strict: this arrangement is eriough to
bring about a collapse of monarchy into despotism. If the king himself
judged, "the constitution by such means would be subverted, and the
dependent intermediate powers annihilated" (SL, VI, 5), and the ex-

ample he cites in the following pages is that of Louis XIII, who
wanted to judge a gentleman himself (ibid.). If we compare this
exclusion and the arguments for it (that if the king judges, the intermediate bodies are annihilated) on the one hand with the arrangement that only calls nobles before a tribunal of their peers, and on the
other with the misfortunes the despot reserves primarily for the great,
we can see that this special clause depriving the king of judiciary
power is imporant above all for the protection of the nobility against
the political and legal arbitration of the prince, and that once again
the despotism Montesquieu threatens us with designates a policy
directed quite precisely against the nobility first of all.
If we now return to the famous balance of the puissances, we
1can, I think, propose an answer to the question: to whose advantage
does the division work?'2 6

It is not necessary to pursue the thought of Althusser further. But
certain matters must be added. First, Schmitt's conception of presidential friend/foe can be the intention of destroying or subordinating all
powers of state, without historic distinction, to the appropriative alien125. Franklin, supra note 3, at 326.
126. L. ALTnJUSSER, supra note 115, at 92-93.
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ating, mediating authority or hegemony of the President. Second,
Hegel's crypto-infrastructural considerations relative to separation of
powers is dialectical and avoids a certain mechanistic or absolutizing
conception of separation of powers which creeps into Althusser's presentation depriving it of full force today when feudal rivalries are no
longer significant and bourgois instability is significant. Third, the
American constitutional conception of sacrosanct infamy-impeachment
and of "high crimes" (or crimes of the high) emerges as a Stoic-like
force to confront and to negate presidential theory of friend/foe, provided that the Senate is not regarded as the unhistoric force, functioning "distantly" from the "society itself." And fourth, more must be said
concerning the mediating role of the judiciary power, which in a
certain sense is a converted ancestor of the idea of presidential hegemony under a theory of friend/foe. As shown, Hegel, in The Phenomenology of Mind, accepts the principle of the role of the three
powers, executive, legislative, judiciary. But in his addition to Paragraph 272 of his Philosophy of Law he explicitly excludes the judiciary from the highest powers of state. 127 This may be due in part to
the primary role he gives to codification. More likely it is due to his
Kafka-like conception of the judiciary itself as an appropriative alienating force which veers process into the relation of oppressor/oppressed,
his fundamental philosophical idea. 2 8 It is in The Phenomenology of
Mind that Hegel most firmly relates the powers and actions of the
state to factionalism grounded in the crypto-infrastructure.
Article one, section five, of the first Constitution states in part:
"Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy." Article two, section three, requires the executive "from time to time to give to the Congress Information of the State
of the Union." These texts are significant in that they give a certain
firmness to an area of separation of powers, though the form or structure of the first Constitution as a thing-in-itself is ambiguous and precipitates strife or struggle for hegemony or the mediating power among
the three divisions. Because the enlightenment, both French and
American, represented a struggle against obscurantism or secrecy, it
seems correct to suggest that the secrecy or "confidentiality" power
127. G. HEGEL, supra note 29, at 286.
128. Id. at 145.
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of the Congress consecrates a limited privilege; and that the duty of
the President to give the Congress "information" consecrates the essential thought of the enlightenment. The attack of Kant on the
concealments of George III and Hegel's attack on Kant's own philosophy of dissemblance are echoes of the theory of the enlightenment in
its struggle against feudal secrecy and feudal obscurantism. Madison
records that "Mr. Gerry, stated the objections which determined him
to withhold his name from the Constitution ... 2. the power of the
House of Representatives to conceal their journals."'2 0
The ninth amendment, in accordance with the methodology of
the Roman law, justifies struggle to explode or to develop a certain
text or texts of the Constitution in order to overcome or negate the
particularism of such text or texts and to state the general force thereof
as historical change necessitates. In regard to the problem of secrecy,
it would appear that article one, section five, and article two, section
three, preclude the development of or the universalization of executive
secrecy.130

V.

THE CONSTITUTION-RECENT THEORY OF INTERPRETATION

Much of what has been discussed in this essay concerns the conception of juridical interpretation, including the methodology of dosing lacunae in the Constitution. The Anglo-American world has a
meagre history of theorists of interpretation save perhaps Coke and
Hobbes. The enlightenment, and the Roman law which it constitutionally justifies, has had a history of twenty-six centuries of theory
and practice of interpretation, quite often of interpretation of formulated law. The American Constitution, which should have been part
129. J. MADISON, supra note 118, at 652.
130. Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and its Implications
for Republican Form of Government, 40 TUL. L. REv. 487 (1966). The opinion of
Chief Justice Burger in United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974), which really
rests on Pound's theory of balance of interests, makes the United States Supreme Court
the unhistoric prince or lord of the Kantian antinomies, in determining governmental
secrecy. Such heroic self-sacrifice to the Kantian idea of duty is not required by the Constitution. In his dissent in Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 420-21 (1961),
Justice Black said: "The truth of the matter is that the balancing test, at least as
applied to date, means that the Committee may engage in any inquiry a majority of
this Court happens to think could possibly be for a legitimate purpose .... And under
the tests of legitimacy that are used in this area, any first-year law school student worth
his salt could construct a rationalization ... ." See supra notes 63, 66.
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of the history of codified law, has been engulfed by Anglo-American
theories of legal methodology, which have become increasingly subjectivistic. On the other hand, the theories of interpretation have had
their varied history in the Roman law. In recent decades there has been
an upsurge of interest in appropriative alienation theories of interpretation in other than England and the United States. This interest reflects bourgeois social crisis in national states possessing Romanist
civil codes. The literature is present also in spheres of social life other
than law-theology, for instance. The most influential Marxist critic
of these developments probably has been W. R. Beyer, writing in the
German Democratic Republic. The great bourgeois names are Husserl
in Germany, Heidegger in the German Federal Republic, Gadamer
in the German Federal Republic, Ricoeur in France, Sartre in
France, Marlas in Spain and Betti in Italy. Of these, undoubtedly the
most important are Betti, Heidegger and Gadamer. Betti and Gadamer
write monumental works; only Betti is a jurist. In the English-speaking world, the most important names are probably Sang-ki Kim, E. D.
Hirsch, Frederic Jameson, Theodore Kisiel and John. O'Neill, none of
whom is a jurist. A representative journal is The New Literary History.
Michel Dufrenne in France suggests the role today of appropriative alienation of language in bourgeois ideology of interpretation.
He writes:
"Who speaks to me, with my own voice?" The genius yielding to inspiration no longer belongs to himself; he is a force of nature; his
"I" is another. Thus the imagination is an origin [est originaire]
because it alienates man to join him to that which he is not. But the
imagination conceived ontologically is not this faculty of losing oneself in a strange speech [parole] that may end in madness; it is this
speech itself, the truth of being anterior to (though expressed by)
3
the distinction between the subjective self and the objective world.1 1
In France, Foucault says of his unthought "man" that "it is both
exterior to him and indispensable to him .... For though this double
may be close, it is alien."'1 2 Schleiermacher, writing in Germany in the
earlier part of the 19th century has also been influential. This author

has written: "Beyer suggests that there is a relation between the latterday Heidegger and Schleiermacher, who says that one of the basic missions of hermeneutics reads: 'to comprehend [zu verstehen] a writer
131. M.
132. M.

DUFRENNE, THE NOTION OF THE A PRIORI 35 (1966).
FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 326 (1970).
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better than he comprehends himself.' ""8 The importance of this in a
theory of interpretation supporting the aggressiveness of presidential
friend/foe theory in confronting the texts of the Constitution is obvious. Of Schleiermacher, Hegel, who himself writes of appropriative
alienation both of work and of language, says: "Dialectic is the last
thing to arise and to maintain its place."' 34 With Heidegger, too, there
is no dialectic. In Being and Time, Heidegger passes from one "moment" to another (universal-particular) without necessitated negation.
"Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomeno8
logical description as a method lies in interpretation."'1
Later in the
same work, Heidegger states:
As understanding Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities. This
Being-toward-possibilitieswhich understands is itself a potentiality-forBeing .... The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility-that of developing itself. This development of the understanding
we call "interpretation" . . . . In it the understanding appropriates
understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself.
Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the
latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; 1it6 is rather the workingout of possibilities projected in understanding.
Beyer has written of Betti, a Romanist jurist: "Betti describes interpretation as triadic."' 1 7 He further stated that the triadic interpretation process has the following character: "Indication (Deutung)
(thought production) of a sign, a task, a role, never resulting in the
opposition of subject-object, but, instead, mediated through an 'inner
linking' with strange spirit, and, indeed, through the mediation of
meaningful stable forms in which this has objectivized itself."''1 Betti's
own Italian text, of which "Deutung" is presumably the translation of
"'a intendere ilsenso," could be translated as "to comprehend the
meaning." The "inner linking" with other spirit in interpretation
which Betti mentions shows the presence of double idealism, that is,
both subjective and objective idealism, and his theory of mediation
133. Franklin, supra note 108, at 541.
134. 3 G.

135. M.
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indicates the place of legal method in authentic meaniftgful stable
form.'8
.The work of Gadamer deserves study 40 by jurists though he is
not one himself. It is sufficient here to mention Palmer's remarks.
For Betti, Gadamer is lost in a standardless existential subjectivity.
In the preface to the 1965 edition of Wahrheit und Methode, Gada-

mer again replies to Betti, this time emphasizing the nonsubjective
character of understanding. The ontological turn of this work (which
Betti deplores) leads Gadamer to view the functioning of the "historically operative consciousness" not as a subjective but as an ontological process.' 4 1
The full fury of such "historically operative consciousness" is the
full fury of the ontological intentionality of existential, presidential
ideology of friend/foe.
Ricoeur's ideology of interpretation incorrectly relates Marx,
Nietzsche and Freud, a characteristic of revisionism. "If we go back,"
he writes, "to the intention they had in common, we find in it the decision to look upon the whole of consciousness, primarily as 'false' consciousness."''
This identification of thinkers is incorrect inasmuch as
Marxism is a materialism, and inasmuch as the historically ascending
force, the force becoming strong enough to negate the appropriative
consciousness, negates such false consciousness of the declining appropriating force. It is false because it is historically limited or fettered.
Ricoeur proceeds to write that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud are "three
masters of suspicion .... All three clear the horizon

. .

not only by

means of a 'destructive' critique, but by the invention of an art of
interpreting."'4 But then Ricoeur admits that "the Marxists are stubbornly insistent on the 'reflex' theory.' 144 Despite Ricoeur, this means
that legal meaning or interpreting has its force in its reflection of its
139. Franklin, supra note 108, at 544. See generally E. BETTI, TEORIA GENERALE
DELLA INTERPRETAZIONE (1955). The German translation is entitled Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften (1967). For historical materialist
criticism of Betti, see Franklin, supra note 108, at 543-44.
140. See H.G. GADAMER, WAHRHEIT UND METHODE (2d ed. 1965). For historical
materialist criticism of Gadamer, see Sang-ki Kim, The Problem of the Contingency of
the World in Husserl's Phenomenology 121-24, 1973 (unpublished dissertation filed
in the Department of Philosophy, State University of New York at Buffalo).
141. R. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS INTERPRETATION THEORY IN SCHLEIERMuACHER,
DILTHEY, HEIDEGGER AND GADAMER 59 (1969).
142. P. RiCOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY 33

143. Id.

144. Id. at 34.

(1970).
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material otherness, that is, in the infrastructure which prevails independently of consciousness. This actuality necessitates possibilities and
not the formalist illusions of constitutional interpretation imagined
within the idealist theory of presidential friend/foe, anguished because
of its crisis of infamia facti. In another connection, this writer said:
In twentieth-century legal thought interpretation or hermeneutics
mediates . . possibilities or choices ...... "No one interpretation is the
reality," Marias writes, "but all of them are reality: in other words,
any one of its interpretations, but only
reality is not exhausted by
45
manifests itself in them." 1
Marias adds: "The perspective, then, is an ingredient of reality; and as
the possible perspectives are many, reality as such implies an essential
multiplicity, and consists precisely in being a repertory of possibilities." 48
POSTSCRIPT: THE

PRESIDENTIAL PARDONING

POWER

The explosive or analogical role of the ninth amendment also affects article two, section two, of the Constitution, which provides that
the President "shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." As
indicated earlier, the constitutional word "offences" encompasses not
only what here have been called "afflictive" crimes, which are to be
punished "according to law," but also impeachment for infamia
facti and "high crimes" for "injuries done immediately to the society
itself." The problem presented by President Ford's recent exercise of
the pardoning power is whether former President Nixon's resignation
from the presidency saves him from the limitation put in the pardoning
power by article two, section two. It is clear that Nixon's resignation
cannot save him from infamy. As Beccaria said, infamy "cannot be determined by law." 147 As infamy is determined by public opinion, it cannot be pardoned by Nixon's presidential successor. Nixon himself, in
"accepting" Ford's pardon, said "[t]hat the way I tried to deal with
Watergate was the wrong way is a burden I shall bear for every day
145. Franklin, Legal Method in the philosophies of Hegel and Savigny, 44 TUL.
L. REv. 766 (1970), citing J.MARfAS, REASON AND LIFE 155 (1956).
146. J.MAufAs, REASON AND LirE 125 (1956).
147. Franklin, supra note 3, at 318.
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of the life that is left to me."' 148 Ford stated of Nixon that "you have
a President who was forced to resign because of circumstances involving his Administration and he has been shamed and disgraced by that
resignation." 149 It is suggested that analogical force of article two, section two, of the Constitution, denying the presidential power of pardon
for impeachment, justifies a struggle to determine that Ford was
without constitutional power to "pardon" a President "forced to resign" and "disgraced by that resignation." Puchta wrote that, in Roman law, "pardon . . . frees only from suffering punishment, con-

ceming which infamy is independent."' 5 0 It should be noted that
Moyers has warned that, already, Nixon's apologists "are quoting the
Supreme Court pronouncement in 1866 that a pardon makes the offender 'as innocent as if he had never committed the offense,' and last
week the former President suggested that his guilt is not in his conduct
but in the minds of other people."' 51
In view of the fact that Ford was virtually appointed to the presidency by Nixon, it is appropriate to suggest that Nixon, and not Ford,
pardoned himself. Anthony Lewis wrote of Ford that "sometimes he
makes it hard to be sure who is President. During the press conference he referred to Mr. Nixon eight times as 'the President'. Was that
just slowness of mind, or something more revealing?" 52 In the private
law thought, even of Anglo-American law, Ford may have sought to
pardon Nixon, his undisclosed principal. In the antiformalist thought
of the modem civil law, Ford may have been an interposed person,
that is, a person whose act seems to be self-determined, but which in
reality has been determined by another, in this case by Nixon. The
role of the interposed person should be exposed and the appropriate
legal effects then determined. In the immediate situation, the appropriate legal effect of such exposure should be that Ford lacked con53
stitutional power to "pardon" Nixon.
Reference has already been made to the sacrosanct or tribunitial
or mediation role of the Congress in impeachment. The sacrosanct
148. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1974, at 1, cols. 4-5.
149. Id., Sept. 17, 1974, at 22, col. 6.
150. F.G. PUCHTA, PANDEKTEN 180-81 & n.y (12th ed. 1877).
151. B. Moyers, Mercy Without Justice, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1974, at 108. I
acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Jay Wishingrad for pointing out the importance of
Moyers' essay.
152. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1974, at 43, col. 1.
153. The theory of interposition of person is an aspect of the general civil law
concept of simulation.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

Congress is justified (indeed, required by Bracton), by the ninth
amendment in engaging in an inner struggle to assert an analogical
power to determine whether its power of impeachment comprehends
what Ford, himself, called a "forced resignation." The sacrosanct Congress, moreover, is justified in asserting a power of research to determine whether Ford has been an interposed person. Even if Ford is not
an interposed person, the sacrosanct Congress is certainly justified in
authorizing research to determine whether the pardon of Nixon is a
fraud on the Constitution-that is, a fraud directed against its sacro1 54
sanct power of impeachment.
154. The idea of fraud on the law obtains in the civil law. In writing on the
subject of conflict of laws, this author stated: "American legal thought is not as scientifir-as is theory of conflict of laws in Romanist national states in which the concepts
of the ordre public of the forum or of fraud on the law are prominent, thus admitting
that the sovereign, at least of the forum, may fully emerge as such during the seeming
struggle of the immediate or interposed subjects of the private law." Franklin, Sketch
of an Historical Foundation for a Tribunitial Theory of Conflict of Laws, 41 TUL. L.

REV. 579, 585-86 (1967). On fraud on the law in Roman law, see A. BERGER, supra
note 68, at 477 ("Fraudare legum; Fraus legi facta" (bibliography)); E. BETTI,
TEORIA GENERAL DEL NEGOCIO JURmICo 283, 298 (c. 1943) (bibliography); I H.
DERNBERG, PANDEKTEN 70 (1896); G. RIPERT, LA REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 345-51 (3d ed. 1955); J. RoussEAu, SIMULATION ET FIDUCiE 56 (1937).

